Predicting War Termination in Multipolar Systems: An Integrated Economic-Historical Framework with Game-Theoretic Calibration and Contemporary Application

Hongxi Wu

doi:10.6911/

Authors

Hongxi Wu Shanghai Qibao Dwight High School, Shanghai, China

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.6911/

Keywords:

War termination, competing risks, economic sanctions, multipolar systems, conflict duration, game theory, Spring and Autumn Period, Ukraine.

Abstract

Although almost no interstate wars have occurred since 1945, and most of those that did were quickly terminated (Waltz 1990), theorising about war termination lags theorising about war onset. Existing negotiation models treat economic factors as exogenous background conditions, rather than as driven by the endogenous incentives embedded in negotiation dynamics. Objective: This paper presents a predictive framework for war termination that incorporates dynamics of economic coercion, structures in multipolar systems, findings from social game theory, and game-theoreticelements usually operationalised. What is particularly novel about our work is the use of ancient Chinese historical data along with modern conflict/war datasets to reveal universal patterns of termination. Methods: Competing risks survival analysis is utilised on two complementary datasets: (1) the Chinese Military Actions Dataset from the Spring and Autumn Period (722--468 BCE; N=360 actions, 134 conflicts), and (2) UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 1946--2024 (N=2752 conflict-years, 303 unique conflicts). This is done by mapping game-theoretic abstractions (grievance, war-weariness, diplomatic capital, combat strength) to measurable indicators and calibrating the variables themselves. Results: Economic sanctions raise the risk of negotiated settlement hazard by about 28% per ten cases (HR=1.28, p<0.001). A, Alliance defection (HR=2.14). The framework has an overall accuracy of 71% in identifying termination windows. The past is a remarkably good predictor of modern conflict dynamics, with the frozen conflict rate for data compiled by Marc Martin from 2,700 years ago standing at 23.1%, compared to the most recent data of 31.2%. Conclusion: By jointly evolving via economic pressure and battlefield dynamics, we conclude that negotiation windows are forming. Draft Twitter thread-More authors, fewer renewals — The multipolar environment is replacing partners faster through increased assurance and termination opportunities. Through a detailed Ukraine case study, we demonstrate the application of our framework and where Q4 2025‐Q1 2026 may be an especially likely window for conflict termination (with 68% negotiated settlement probability).

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